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SURVEY OF KANSAS LAW
sational headlines to news dispatches which they publish."37 For its
authority the court found one of the delightfully succinct statements
of the Late Honorable Rousseau A. Burch, then an Associate Justice
of the Kansas Supreme Court, which reads as follows: "It is the prac-
tice of some newspapers deliberately to put poison in a headline and




Consent: The court has now started the retreat from the legal im-
plications of In re Thompson.' In the Thompson case, the court held
that a mother could withdraw her consent to adoption at any time
prior to the final decree of the probate court.' The Sedgwick County
District Court, in Hawes v. Rhodes,3 faced the following facts. Two
sets of parents had signed contracts surrendering their respective chil-
dren to the Maud Carpenter Children's Home under the provisions of
KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-112, 113, 114.' Some four years after both sets of
children entered the home, their parents met and married each other.
The parents then asked the home to return their children. Mr. Rhodes,
the president of the corporation, refused. Later, the parents sent formal
notice of the recision of the surrender agreement and brought this
habeas corpus action. The trial court, on authority of the Thompson
case,5 held that parents could withdraw consent at any time prior to
a final order of adoption and ordered the home to return the children.
8 Marteney v. United Press Association, 224 F.2d 714, 716 (1955).
' Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 667, 261 Pac. 851, 855 (1927).
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, A.B., 1951, LL.B. 1953,
Kansas Univ.; LL.M., 1954, Yale Univ.
1178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955).
2 For the facts and background of this case see Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REv. 225
(1955).
179 Kan. 716, 298 P.2d 276 (1956).
These sections provide for a statutory scheme whereby parents are given the right to sur-
render their children to corporations authorized by KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-112 to receive them. The
corporation then assumes the duties of natural guardian and apparently under KAN. G.S. 1949,
38-114 (b) may consent to the adoption of the children. In its decision, the court makes no
reference to these sections of the statutes, but it is clear from the brief of the appellant and the
nature of the case that the basic statutory authority for the action of the Home is found in
these statutes.
' 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955).
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The supreme court reversed. It stated that the existence of the benevo-
lent home, which had a duty to care for children accepted by the home,
distinguished this case from the Thompson case. The court then says
that we have here not only the element of adoption, but other facts
and circumstances. Apparently the court is referring to the fact that
these homes have "and possess over such children all the rights apper-
taining to the natural or legal guardian."6
The court concludes by saying that no evidence had been presented
as to whether it would be better for the children to stay at the home
or go back with their parents. "These matters deserve some considera-
tion.... .,
There is a paucity of decisions on the validity of these surrender
contracts. In the only Kansas case in point, Wilson v. Kansas Children's
Home,8 our court protected the right of a twenty-year-old mother to
regain custody of her illegitimate child. The court decided the case on
the technical grounds that the home had not formally accepted custody
as required by the statutes, even though Justice Hoch, concurring,
argued that the minority of the mother should invalidate the contract.'
The case might leave the implication that if the correct procedure had
been followed, the mother would have no right to her child, although
the opinion suggests that the court is opposed to these contracts.
These contracts present a real problem. The criteria-what is best
for the child'-° requires a looseness of appellate rule and correspond-
ing discretion on the part of the trial court. Certainly the Thompson
case allowed the mother too much control too long." Yet, to hold that
the contract becomes irrevocable, also defeats the purpose of the rule.
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-114. The appellants presented this argument in the brief. The court
does not quote the statute and merely says that "It would be somewhat more difficult to dis-
tinguish between the Thompson case, supra, and the present case . . . if we were to go on the
assumption that only an adoption element is involved, but other facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the . . . children compel us to consider further." 179 Kan. 716, 719, 298 P.2d 276,
278 (1956).
179 Kan. at 719, 298 P.2d at 279. The appellant had argued that even though the contract
was not binding, the court should not turn over the children without checking into the fitness
of the parents. They cited In re Bullen, 28 Kan. 781 (1882), to the effect that such an inquiry
could be made in a habeas corpus action.
8 159 Kan. 325, 154 P.2d 137 (1944). This case was cited by appellant, but not mentioned
by the court. According to appellant's brief, the only case in point is Galilean Children's Home,
Inc., et al. v. Ball, 308 Ky. 319, 214 S.W.2d 403 (1948), holding that the parents could regain
their children. The Oklahoma court on July 17, 1956, in In re Sutherland, 301 P.2d 224 (Okla.
1956), decided in favor of the parents and against the home. The Oklahoma statute was differ-
ent, but the same basic problem is discussed.
.In 1947, the Legislature amended KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-113 to expressly provide that:
"Minority of a parent shall not invalidate such parent's surrender of said child."
"5 See CHILD CUSTODY, Unfitness doctrine, infra, for a discussion of several new cases that
perhaps limit this criteria.
' See Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REV. 225 (1955).
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Children's homes serve a valuable and needful function and must pro-
tect the stability of the lives of the children against old and forgotten
parents. But, they do not always serve the best interests of the child.
Until the time comes when the state acts through social workers in-
stead of judges to determine the future happiness of children, a chil-
dren's home should not have the final decision nor should the parents
be allowed to irrevocably surrender this right by contract. 2 The court
is correct in saying that this case is different from an adoption case."
The contract technically surrenders custody and the question of
adoption would arise later. If the home had consented to an adoption, 4
or if the child had been in a foster home, then the court implies that the
rule of the Thompson case would control. The court seems to feel that
the further removed the children are from the parents, the greater is
the right of the parents to recover.'"
However, the opinion is not clear as to what the trial court is to do.
Apparently, if the trial court finds that the parents are fit, it may, at
its discretion, allow the return of the children.'
II. BASTARDY
Proof: In In re Estate of Case,'7 a fifty-eight-year-old woman tried
to show that she was the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Mr.
Case. She had to meet the proof requirements of KAN. G.S. 1949,
59-501,8 but the passage of time ruined her chance. The only direct
'See CHILD CUSTODY. Contracts, infra, for another case discussing the rights to contract for
custody.
'8 Actually, this case should be discussed under the heading of child custody. It is placed under
adoption because the trial court relied upon In re Thompson.
" KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-114 (b) apparently so provides. KAN. G.S. 1955 SuPp. 59-2102 (5),
the consent section of the adoption code, states that such Homes may consent to an adoption.
However, it is an open question as to whether the surrender contract must allow the Home to
consent. Compare the wording of KAN G.S. 1935, 38-114 with that of KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-114
(b) and the last phrase of KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 59-2102. Mr. Hawes had crossed out the
consent portion of his surrender contract. I assume that children's Homes make it a practice to
include a consent clause.
'Actually parents and especially unmarried mothers do need some protection. If consent to
the Home is consent to adoption and is irrevocable, then mothers should not be allowed to give
up their children upon whim. The 1947 Legislature added the requirement that all surrenders
be acknowledged, see KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-113. But this is little protection against a Home, hav-
ing an over-abundance of prospective adoptive parents, seeking to induce the mother to give up
her child.
" Perhaps it must. See the discussion, infra, this section, Unfitness Doctrine. While the cases
therein discussed do not involve contracts or children's homes, the problem is much the same
and perhaps the court will be consistent and protect the parents.
180 Kan. 53, 299 P.2d 589 (1956).
"Children . . . includes illegitimate children when applied . . . to father and child where
the father has notoriously or in writing recognized his paternity of the child, or his paternity
thereof has been determined in his lifetime by any action or proceeding involving that question
in a court of competent jurisdiction."
1956]
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evidence she had was one old man who could not remember what Mr.
Case had said. All the other witnesses testified that it was assumed
in the community that deceased was her father. Commenting on the
evidence, the court said: "[I]t must not be forgotten that what the
statute deals with is not notoriety of paternity but notoriety of recog-
nition of the child by the father. . .. "'
Finally, the plaintiff attempted to show that the paternity had been
judicially established in a justice of the peace court in 1895. All she had
was the record of a compromise settlement between deceased and the
plaintiff's mother that for $50.00 the mother would dismiss the suit. °
The court comments that the language is not a judicial determination
of paternity nor is it sufficient to be an acknowledgment in writing.
Defendant merely bought his peace.
Sympathy lies with the daughter. The deceased had no close rela-
tives,21 and she probably was entitled to the estate. Yet the statute is
clear and the danger of fraud great. The statute is worth protecting
even where, as here, there might be unfairness. Finally, while the court
found that the compromise proved nothing, attorneys should still spe-
cifically state in the compromise agreement that the man does not
admit paternity.
In State ex rel. v Hall,12 another bastardy action, the state's appeal
was denied when it merely showed that some of the jurymen admitted
misconduct. This procedural point was handled by the court and no
doctrine of family law was decided.
III. CHILD CUSTODY
Contracts: Some interesting dicta is found in Leach v. Leach2 on
the right of a parent to surrender custody of the child to the other
parent. The mother had signed a "relinquishment" of the child to the
father, and she claimed that the trial court could not hold her to this
agreement. The supreme court concurred, even though they refused
' 180 Kan. at 58, 299 P.2d at 592 (1956). The quote is from Meyer v. Rogers, 173 Kan. 124,
129, 244 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1952) which in turn is quoting from the dissenting opinion by
Justice Burch in Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294, 302, 182 Pac. 538, 542 (1919).
o "On or about Aug. 13 at the earnest request of both defendant and plaintiff, the case was
compromised by the payment to plaintiff her own price of $50.00.
Whereupon said plaintiff entered into an agreement to stay all further and any future pro-
ceedings against said Charles Lester Case. Defendant paying all costs of the action." 180 Kan.
at 59, 299 P.2d at 593.
' The state was a party claiming that the property escheated. The case does not disclose
the relationship of the other heirs.
= 178 Kan. 489, 289 P.2d 781 (1955).
179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956).
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to set aside the agreement. The court says that the "relinquishment"
was not binding, but, as it was freely made and the mother had a right
to state to the court what would be best for her child, the trial court
could examine it. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to award custody to the mother."' The court then
goes on to say that children are not the subject of gifts and that there
are only three ways a parent, by his own act, may escape the respon-
sibility for his own children: (1) a finding of unfitness under KAN.
G.S. 1955 Supp., 60-1510;25 (2) a valid adoption decree; or (3) a finding
of neglect in a juvenile court proceeding. Finally, the court says that
the district court, under KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510, has a continuing duty
to make provisions for custody, support, and education, and it is the
court, not the parents, that grants or denies custody.
Of course, these statements are dicta as the court found that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the father
independently of the contract. Concerning the custody alone, the
statement might stand in future cases even though the court makes
no mention of right of a parent to surrender custody to a children's
home under KAN. G.S. 1949, 38-112, 113, 114.26 However, as to con-
tracts and the district court's continuing duty to control child support,
see Feldman v. Feldman2" and Grimes v. Grimes" discussed under
DIVORCE, Property Rights, infra.
The dicta is sound and should be followed. While attorneys con-
tinually draw separation agreements that provide for custody, surely
none advise their clients that the court would be bound to follow it.
If we are to protect the welfare of the child, the district court must
retain continuing jurisdiction over custody matters.2"
Unfitness Doctrine: In the 1955 Survey of Kansas Law,30 the cases
of Pearson v. Pearson8 and Collins v. Collins 2 were noted. In those
cases, the court said that there need not be a finding of the mother's
unfitness in order to grant custody to the father in a divorce action.
" For this aspect of the case, see infra this section, Unfitness Doctrine.
' This is the child custody and support section of the divorce statute.
These sections are discussed supra, under the heading ADOPTION.
179 Kan. 109, 292 P.2d 716 (1956).
t 179 Kan. 340, 295 P.2d 646 (1956).
'This is not to say that the wishes of the parents should be ignored. Trial courts should
accede to the contract unless plainly harmful to the child.
'
0 See Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. Rav. 228 (1955).
176 Kan. 306, 220 P.2d 205 (1954).
177 Kan. 50, 276 P.2d 321 (1954).
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Four cases decided during the past year, Selanders v. Anderson,8
Leach v. Leach, 4 Christlieb v. Christlieb,85 and Heilman v. Heilman,"6
show the limited nature of the Pearson and Collins cases.
In the Leach case, 7 the court re-affirms, without citing, the holdings
of the Pearson and Collins cases. The father was allowed to retain
custody of the child even though the court did not find the mother
unfit."8
Then, in Selandus v. Anderson 9 this question was raised: A father
is given custody of his children in a divorce action, later remarries, and
then dies. Who is entitled to custody-his first wife, the mother of the
children; or his second, their step-mother? The court held that "The
mother and father are the natural guardians of their minor children.
If either dies, or is incapable of acting, the natural guardianship de-
volves upon the other."4 The step-mother had been appointed
guardian of the estate of the children, but the probate court made no
finding that the mother was unfit. When the step-mother attempted to
adopt the child, the natural mother obtained an injunction from the dis-
trict court restraining the step-mother. In determining legality of the
injunction, the court held for the natural mother and said, "She [the
step-mother] had no inherent or natural right to the children. They
belong with their only remaining natural parent, their mother, unless
she is adjudged by some court of competent jurisdiction to be an unfit
and improper person to have the children.""'
In the Christlieb case,42 the actual contest was between the mother
and paternal grandmother of the children. The trial judge refused
to take the custody from the grandmother even though he did not find
the mother unfit. The court, reversing, said:
It is a firmly-established rule in this state that a parent who is able to care for
his children and desires to do so, and who has not been found to be an unfit
person to have their custody in an action or proceeding where the question is in
"178 Kan. 664, 291 P.2d 425 (1955).
179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956).
179 Kan. 408, 295 P.2d 658 (1956).
180 Kan. 116, 299 P.2d 601 (1956).
" 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956). For another aspect of this case, see the discussion,
supra, this section, CONTRACTS.
'The court quotes from Travis v. Travis, 163 Kan. 54, 180 P.2d 310 (1947), to the effect
that it is not error to give custody to the father or to have alternating custody.
178 Kan. 664, 291 P.2d 425 (1955).
178 Kan. 664, 667, 291 P.2d 425, 426 (1955) quoting from Johnson v. Best, 156 Kan.
668, 671, 135 P.2d 896, 898 (1943). See KAN. G.S. 1949, 59-1802.
, 178 Kan. at 668, 291 P.2d at 428.
179 Kan. 408, 295 P.2d 658 (1956).
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issue, is entitled to the custody of his children as against grandparents or others
who have no permanent or legal right to this custody, even though at the time
the natural parent seeks their custody, such grandparents or others are giving
the children proper and suitable care and have acquired an attachment for
them.43
Then, in the Heilman case, 4 the court, citing Christlieb, in com-
plete obiter dictum," says that without a finding of unfitness, the trial
court may not divide custody between the grandparents and the
mother.
These four cases point up the basic conflict facing the court in
determining custody matters. The court has almost invariably stated
that it will be guided by what is best for the child. But, in a contest
between a parent and another relative, the parent, if fit, wins even
though a psychologist or social worker would say that this would not be
for the best interests of the child.4 6
Space limitations prevent a longer discussion of this problem. How-
ever, a few comments are inevitable. First, what is the hornbook law?
If the fight is between parents, the trial court has almost complete
discretion and no finding of unfitness need be made.4 7 If the fight is
between a surviving mother who did not have custody and a step-
mother, who did, the mother wins unless she is found unfit.48 And,
if the contest is between a mother and grandparents, the mother must
be given custody unless she is found unfit.
4
The results obtained by the present court are consistent with most
of the Kansas precedent available to them. There was sufficient author-
ity for the court to say that a parent has preference against all the world
unless "unfit."5
" 179 Kan. 408, 409, 295 P.2d 658, 659 (1956), quoting from Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459,
463, 201 P.2d 637, 641 (1949).
"180 Kan. 116, 299 P.2d 601 (1956). This case had previously been to the supreme court
on a conflict of laws problem. In re Heilman, 176 Kan. 5, 269 P.2d 459 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 944 (1955). For the history and facts of the case, see Comment, Full Faith and Credit
to Child Custody Awards," 5 KAN. L. REV. 77 (1956); Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REV. 224, 228(1956).
" The mother's appeal was filed too late. The court, however, closes out the opinion by say-
ing: "Were the case here we would hold . . . only failure of the appeal causes us to withhold
making such an order." 180 Kan. at 119, 299 P.2d at 603.
"For a discussion of this conflict generally, see Note, Custody of Children: Best Interests of
Child v. Rights of Parents, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306 (1945). The Kansas cases are discussed in
Johnstone, Child Custody, 1 KAN. L. REV. 37, 42 (1952).
"The Pearsons, Collins, and Leach cases.
"The Selander case.
'o The Cristlieb and Heilman cases.
'Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 (1949) is probably the closest on the facts to
the Cristlieb case. Prior to this decision, the court had used language seemingly preferring the
best interests of the child. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) where the court, even
1956]
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The opinions in the earlier cases seem to resolve this troublesome
conflict in favor of the parents based on one or a combination of the
following sociological and psychological beliefs: (1) If the parent is
fit, then it will be for the best interests of the child to give the parent
custody. (2) The emotional stability of the parent is important and
will be helped if he has custody."
The court also seems reluctant, despite many statements to the
contrary, to completely abandon the legal property right concept. The
parents brought the children into the world, the mother was in physical
danger, and both have to support. Therefore, the state, even though it
stands as parens patriae to all children, may not take the child from
its parents unless they are "unfit." The state does not have this power.52
Even if sociologists or psychologists could infallibly discover what
was actually best for the child, the court is not and should not be bound
by their "best guesses." As long as it is felt desirable to have "legal"
rights in custody matters, the responsibility of decision will rest with
a court. Who can say that the reasons for the parents preference are
erroneous? But, the approach exemplified in the Selander, Christlieb,
and Heilman cases is too restrictive. The court imposes a mechanical
test; the finding of "unfitness." The trouble lies in the meaning of the
word "unfit." On a doctrinal level there are probably three standards.
In adoption cases, the new parents must be imminently qualified. In
divorce cases, the mother may have some faults and still be "fit."
Lastly, it is only when she falls below a bare minimum that the juvenile
court would take custody away from her on a dependent and neglect
charge. Yet, in all three types of cases, the court uses some form of
"fitness" as a test.53
8
Even if the court specifies what level of fitness is required, the term
is still ambiguous. To require a trial court to find the mother "unfit,"
say on the divorce case level, tells him nothing in terms of what the
mother has done or not done. Unless the supreme court wishes to at-
though granting custody to the grandparents, specifically states that the father is not unfit.
Chapsky must be considered overruled by Stout and certainly by Cristlieb.6' See opinion of Professor Johnstone in Child Custody, 1 KAN. L. REv. 37, 42 (1952) and
especially notice the language of the court in Loucka v. State Department of Social Welfare, 163
Kan. 1, 179 P.2d 791 (1949). The basic problem is lucidly explained by Justice Dawson in In re
Kailer, 123 Kan. 229, 255 Pac. 41 (1927).
"' See citations supra, note 51 and notice the language in In re Thompson, 178 Kan. 127,
283 P.2d 493 (1955) where the court specifically refuses to decide the consent to adoption
questions on the basis of the child's welfare.
'There are no citations to directly support this division of the word, "unfit." It is based
upon the reading of many of the cases and the assumed, but perhaps falsely assumed, action of
trial courts when the various types of cases are presented to them.
[Vol. 5
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tempt to specify just what a mother may do and still be "fit," it is going
to have to allow discretion on the part of the trial court.
Under the present mechanical rule, the trial court, if it desires to
give the child to a grandparent, must go through the ritual of finding
the parent unfit. But should the rights of the parties depend on a mat-
ter of form? Granted that the supreme court could reverse on the
facts and attempt to establish criteria of fitness, yet, throughout the
court's history, it has been reluctant to overrule the trial court's find-
ings of fact. The trial court still has the advantage in that it sees the
parties in court. Further, this mechanical rule of unfitness prohibits
a trial court from dividing custody between a grandparent and mother.
If the mother is adjudged "fit," she is entitled to total custody. If she
is "unfit," then the court could not grant her custody at any time."4
Therefore, it would be better if the court would say that the trial courts
should have discretion, though they should give preference to parents.
If there is no evidence in the record to justify dividing the time or
giving the custody to the grandparents, the supreme court could reverse.
There is a substantial difference between saying that mothers are pre-
ferred and that mothers must be given custody unless unfit.5"
IV. CONTRACTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Antenuptial: In re Estate of Ward56 restates the hornbook law on
the necessity of fair disclosure of the assets of the husband in an ante-
nuptial contract. Kansas, however, does not require full disclosure so
long as the contract is fair and no actual fraud is shown. Mere conceal-
ment does not raise a presumption of fraud. 7 The plaintiff was not
able to show actual fraud, and, even though she bargained away all but
a life estate in a home, the court would not reverse the trial court find-
ing of fairness. She knew that the deceased was rich, and she had had
her attorney look over the contract. The court would not let her repudi-
ate and claim a statutory share.
"' Of course, an argument exists that even though "unfit" as to the grandmother, she would
be "fit" as to the standard applied in neglect cases. Therefore, she would be entitled to part
custody. But from the single use of the word in these cases and under the Heilman case rule,
custody could not be divided.
. See ADOPTION, supra, for a discussion of this same problem when the conflict is between
a children's home and parents.
178 Kan. 366, 285 P.2d 1081 (1955).
' The rule is found at 178 Kan. at 370, 285 P.2d at 1084. See also, In re Estate of Beeler,
175 Kan. 190, 262 P.2d 939 (1953) discussed in Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REv. 224, 237
(1955). The Beeler case covered a post-nuptial contract. The court does not cite it but the rule
is the same.
1956]
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The plaintiff also raised an argument concerning consideration. She
was to have a home and the deceased husband had only purchased a
trailer house. She claimed failure of consideration. The court found no
lack of consideration. It said that marriage was sufficient. From the
opinion it is difficult to tell whether the court saw the distinction. This
aspect of the case is discussed in the Survey section on CONTRACTS.
Post-Nuptial: In re Estate of Bradley5" is another of the many fact
appeals found in the Kansas Reports. The children of the now de-
ceased husband are claiming an interest in the previously deceased
wife's estate. Her children established a postnuptial contract. They
showed two letters from the deceased husband in which he mentioned
the agreement, an old will, and quitclaim deed that confirms its ex-
istence. This was sufficient for the trial court to find that the agreement
existed and that there was sufficient "writing" to satisfy the statute of
frauds. The supreme court would not reverse.
V. DIVORCE
Property rights, alimony, and child support: Suprisingly enough,
no cases were decided by the court on any questions of the sufficiency
of facts to support a divorce decree. But parties are still litigating and
appealing the property questions.
Mathey v. Mathey59 is a near perfect example of the bitterness and
protracted litigation that result from marital discord. When the case
was first before the supreme court in 1953,6" the court states that "This
was the fourth divorce action. The first was dismissed. The second was
tried and a divorce was granted. Thereafter the parties remarried.
During the pendency of the third action the parties effected a recon-
ciliation and made a property settlement. They later concluded a fur-
ther attempt to reconcile their differences was hopeless . . . plaintiff
[then] filed the instant action."'" The plaintiff lost in her attempt to
upset the alimony award and later in a written opinion, the court denied
a rehearing. 2 Plaintiff is now claiming that the husband perjured him-
self by not telling the full extent of his personal property and that the
179 Kan. 539, 297 P.2d 180 (1956).
6 179 Kan. 284, 294 P.2d 202 (1956).
®Mathey v. Mathey, 175 Kan. 446, 264 P.2d 1058 (1953). See Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN.
L. REv. 224, 235 (1955).
61 175 Kan. at 447, 264 P.2d at 1059.
Mathey v. Mathey, 175 Kan. 733, 267 P.2d 516 (1954). In this opinion, the court does
correct several mistatements of fact in the first opinion. However, none induced the court to
change its mind.
[Vol. 5
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judgment should be set aside for fraud." The husband demurred. The
trial court sustained the demurrer and the supreme court affirmed,
pointing out the well-established distinctions between intrinsic fraud,
for which you may not upset judgement and extrinsic fraud, for which
you may.64
Surely the courts are a poor place to handle this kind of dispute.
The fight appears to be personal, not legal. The parties need a marriage
counsellor, not lawyers. It is too bad that our legal system allows such
protracted litigation.
Then, in Groh v Groh,65 the wife complained that the division of
property was unfair. The divorce was granted to the wife but the court
allowed her only 25 per cent of the property. The court held that the
amount awarded was not an abuse of discretion. The court states that
the financial dealings between the parties were "not understandable,"
that the wife got a substantial amount and that the parties were worse
off than before the marriage.
The decision is correct and is but another example of the discretion
lodged in the trial court. However, the court is careless in quoting
from the statute. Both the trial court and the supreme court treated
the matter as one for division of property under the third sentence of
KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511, which allows a division of the property jointly
acquired. The court, in citing this statute, quotes only from the second
sentence which provides for alimony from the husband's property
when the divorce is granted for his fault.6
Finally, there are two cases that raise the question of the validity
of contract for child support and alimony. In the first, Grimes v.
Grimes67 a sixteen-year-old high school girl successfully obtained ali-
mony and child support from her "shotgunned" husband. The hus-
band, twenty-six, had seduced her. When her parents found that she
was pregnant, they mentioned statutory rape. A conference was held
and the boy signed an agreement with the parents that he would marry
' See KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-3007 (4th) which gives a court the power to vacate a judgment for
fraud.O Extrinsic: That which prevents a fair presentation of the issue to the court. Intrinsic: That
which prevents a fair determination of the issues, once presented. Perjury prevents a fair de-
termination of the issues.
179 Kan. 353, 295 P.2d 653 (1956).
' The facts of the case suggest that the property divided was jointly acquired and apparently
in this type of case, the result would be the same. However, the quotation is misleading. See
Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REv. 224, 235 (1955) for a discussion of other cases where
the court has had problems in distinguishing among the four sentences of KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-
1511.
' 179 Kan. 340, 295 P.2d 646 (1956).
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the daughter and pay for the hospital bill. They agreed that after the
contemplated divorce, they would support the daughter and child.
The husband brought suit for a divorce a few weeks after the marriage.
But the daughter did not stay "bought." She filed a cross-petition
asking for divorce, child custody, alimony and support. The trial court
granted her the divorce and the custody of the child, but refused to
grant alimony or child support. Over objection of the wife, the contract
was introduced in evidence and "considered" by the trial court.
On appeal, the court held that: (1) It was an error to admit the
contract in evidence, since (a) "plaintiff could not relieve himself of
his common law or statutory obligation to support his child by enter-
ing into an agreement with a third person to assume that responsibility.
'It is beyond the power of a father to deprive the court by private agree-
ment of its right to make provisions for the support of the minor
children, as the children's welfare requires. The support of children,
like their custody, is a matter of social concern. It is an obligation the
father owes to the state as well as his children. He has no right to
permit them to become a public charge.' "0 And (b) the defendant
wife was not a party to the contract; (2) it was error not to grant child
support since KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510, says that the district court shall
make an order for child support, custody and education and (3) it was
error not to grant alimony since KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510 says that the
district court shall grant alimony when the divorce is for the fault of
the husband.
The other case, Feldmann v. Feldmann,"9 was an appeal from an
order by the district court that set aside, because of lack of jurisdiction,
two previous orders modifying a still previous child support order.
In 1946, the parties signed a lengthy separation agreement in which
the husband agreed, among other things, to pay "so long as his minor
children be living with and in the custody of the wife and throughout
their minority. .. to his wife, as maintenance and support for the wife
and children, the sum of ... ($340.00) per month ... ,,7o There were
other provisions for modification upon certain contingencies such as
the husband changing jobs. The wife then obtained a divorce from
the husband and the contract was presented to the court and apparently
179 Kan. at 342, 295 P.2d at 648.
179 Kan. 109, 292 P.2d 716 (1956).
70 Quoted from the first appeal, Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 701, 204 P.2d 742,
744 (1949).
[Vol. 5
SURVEY OF KANSAS LAW
made part of the decree. Some time later, the husband moved to strike
all portions of the decree except that relating to the divorce on the
grounds that it was for the payment of alimony in an indefinite amount
and so void. The court denied the motion and on an appeal, the su-
preme court held in the first Feldmann case7' that the original decree
was not void. The court admitted that there were two lines of cases :72
one holding that indefinite awards were void," the other allowing
contracts between parties that were for an indefinite sum if approved
by the court and not merged into the decree.7" The court then dis-
tinguishes the first line of cases and holds that they apply only in cases
where it is for alimony. They do not apply where the money is paid
upon obligations to support the children, even though she was to
participate therein. Therefore, it makes no difference that this semi-
support contract75 was made a part of the judgment. After this decree
was handed down, the husband attempted to obtain a modification
of the decree by reducing the amount of the child support payments.
The trial court granted the reduction and then later reversed itself
upon motion made by the wife. From this reversal, the husband appeals
in the instant case.
The court apparently held two things: First, that the decision in
the first Feldmann case decided the issue in favor of the wife and was
res judicata and, second, that upon fresh examination, the rights and
liabilities of the parties were governed by the contract and not by the
statutory authority in divorce cases.7"
How are we to interpret these two cases? What effect do they have
on the previous law? The Feldmann case can be interpreted as merely
holding that any question arising out of the law suit was res judicata
since the original decree was not appealed from. However, the court
states that it re-examined the problem of the right of the court to
modify semi-support contracts. Something of the history of these cases
is necessary to the understanding of the problem. Frequently, the court
was faced with the problem of what effect to give to a separation
' Supra note 70.
aSee Note 1 KAN. L. REv. 199 (1953).
"See e.g., Conway v. Conway, 130 Kan. 848, 288 Pac. 566 (1930).
' See e.g., Petty v. Petty, 147 Kan. 342, 76 P.2d 850 (1938).
' The word "semi-support" will be used hereafter to refer to those contracts where the
money is to be paid to the wife both for the support of the children and for her own support.
Notice the language of the contract in this case quoted, supra at note 70 in the text. The word
"alimony" will be used to designate contracts for the support of the wife alone.
"'The court cites In re Estate of Shideler, 172 Kan. 695, 242 P.2d 1057 (1952) and French
v. French, 171 Kan. 76, 229 P.2d 1014 (1951) as authority in the second alternative holding.
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agreement between divorcing spouses. Many such contracts provided
for payments to the wife. Some talked in terms of alimony, some in
terms of child support. These contracts were given to the court at the
time of divorce, and if fair, were either approved or were made the
basis for the judgment. But, the court was bothered by the so-called
merger doctrine, i.e., a contract that was made part of a decree became
merged in that decree and ceased to exist, and, under KAN. G.S. 1949,
60-1511, the alimony had to be of a fixed amount and frequently the
contracts provided for an indefinite amount. Therefore, if the court
found a merger, both the contract and the decree were void. The court
then started talking in terms of "approval" rather than merger and so
gave validity to the contract.77 The holdings of these cases allowed the
parties to circumvent the fixed alimony provisions of the KAN. G.S.
1949, 60-1511 and still not run afoul of the rule of the Calkins case7"
requiring all property questions to be settled in a divorce case. In the
first Feldmann case,79 the parties had an indefinite agreement that had
been made a part of the decree. The court, desiring to uphold separation
contracts whenever possible, found that the contract was valid and dis-
tinguished the earlier cases on the grounds that this contract provided
for payment to the wife for support of the children. It made no differ-
ence that she would, incidently, receive some of the benefits. Then, in
French v. French,"° the court held that this semi-support agreement
probably was not merged, but it made no difference since the money
was to be paid to the wife for both her and the children. The trial court
had held, in a suit to reduce payments, that the contract was void and
ordered payments reduced under authority of KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510.
This statute, providing for child support, custody, and education of the
children, unlike the alimony statute,81 states that the court shall have
continuing jurisdiction and may modify any award. The supreme
court, therefore, was forced to decide the validity of a reduction in
payments which contravened the agreement. Citing three earlier cases,
82
the court held that the trial court could not reduce the payments.
Actually, the three earlier cases merely held that an agreement made
after the decree had been rendered that a fixed amount to be paid
"r See Note, I KAN. L. REv. 199 (1953), where the two lines of authority are set out.
" Calkins v. Calkins, 155 Kan. 43, 122 P.2d 750 (1942).
" Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 204 P.2d 742 (1949).
'0 171 Kan. 76, 229 P.2d 1014 (1951).
8'KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1511.
"'Dutcher v. Dutcher, 103 Kan. 645, 175 Pac. 975 11918); Miller v. Morrison, 43 Kan. 446,
23 Pac. 612 (1890); and Walrath v. Walrath, 27 Kan. 395 (1882).
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would relieve the father from the extra amount required by the decree.
These cases did not hold that once a contract was made, the court lost
its power to modify support payments. In In re Estate of Shideler,"a
the other case cited in the second Feldmann case,84 the court, in a
purely alimony, not semi-support, case, held that the contract had not
been merged and that the wife could still sue on the contract. The
court cites both the support cases, says it sees no distinction and con-
cludes that the language of the trial court shows only approval not
merger.85
In effect, what has the court held? The second Feldmann case fol-
lows the French case, but the French case misconceived the problem.
Starting out with the need to circumvent the alimony statute, the court
first held that merger did not void the indefinite judgment in semi-
support cases.86 Then, the court held that the contract was not extin-
guished even though merged, and since the contract existed, the court's
jurisdiction to modify child support orders was superceded" In theory,
at least, if there is a merger, the contract disappears and only the
judgment exists; a judgment that may be modified under KAN. G.S.
1949, 60-1510. Therefore, we must conclude that either (1) the doctrine
of merger no longer exists in semi-support cases or (2) a judgment
fixing semi-support may not be modified even though KAN. G.S. 1949,
60-1510 says that it may. From a legal theory point of view, neither
conclusion is tenable. From a policy point of view, the results are
questionable. The Legislature plainly stated that in alimony cases it
wanted fixed amounts, while in child support cases, it wanted the
court to be free to later change those amounts. To these policies, the
court has added a third: that it favors contracts between spouses
settling property, alimony, and support rights. Perhaps this is a good
policy, but by its adoption, the court has allowed the parties to con-
travene the policy of the Legislature. By contract, an attorney may
now provide for variable alimony and fixed support.
172 Kan. 695, 242 P.2d 1057 (1952).
179 Kan. 109, 292 P.2d 716 (1956).
s But, in both support cases, there has been mergers and the court said it made no differ-
ence since the contract was for support. And, see Thoele v. Thoele, 176 Kan. 655, 272 P.2d 1082
(1954), an alimony case, where the court allows a wife to sue on the contract since it had not
been merged.
' The first Feldmann case. This argument is maintainable since support, under the statute,
does not have to be for a fixed amount.
' French v. French, 171 Kan. 76, 229 P.2d 1014 (1951).
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Practically speaking, it means that attorneys should be careful in
agreeing to contracts containing child support provisions. Once the
parties agree to pay a certain amount, changed conditions will not let
them out. The contract itself should better provide for a change in
payments based upon changed conditions.
However, an attorney must be careful. Neither the legal reasoning
nor the policy basis of these decisions will carry over into other areas.
The court has no qualms about throwing out a support contract made
by the future husband and the parents of the future wife. As the court
said in the Grimes case:"8 "It is beyond the power of a father to deprive
the court by private agreement of its right to make provisions for the
support of the minor children, as the children's welfare requires.""
Granted that the contract was not with the wife, but should that make
any difference? An enforceable contract with a wife defeats a child's
rights as much as a contract with the grandparents. But, there is a
partially valid difference in the two types of cases. Some support is
agreed to in the Feldmann case, none in the Grimes case. However,
changed conditions in the Feldmann-type situation might render an
adequate amount in 1946 inadequate in 1956. Yet the contract binds
the court.
The court also has little patience with contracts that attempt to fix
the custody of children." The court says that in custody cases KAN.
G.S. 1949, 60-1510 controls. This statute also controls support. Yet, the
court holds that support contracts are valid while custody contracts
are not.
The Grimes case also held that it was error not to allow any sup-
port nor any alimony. Both statutes, KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1510 and
60-1511, use the word shall, although there are many cases where the
court did not render an alimony decree when the divorce was granted
for the fault of the husband." The court cites adequate authority to
hold that in a case where the wife has nothing and the husband is
working, the trial court abused its discretion in not making an award.
' 179 Kan. 340, 295 P.2d 646 (1956).
lid. at 343, 295 P.2d at 648.
'0 Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956). See a discussion of the case under
CHILD CUSTODY, Contracts, supra.
o' E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 166 Kan. 386, 201 P.2d 1076 (1949). The argument was over the
amount of the property division, not the fact that no alimony as such was awarded.
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VI. MARRIAGES
Common Law Wife: Two more fact cases were added to the
Amerine case.92 In the first, Whetstone v. Whetstone,9" the court held
that the plaintiff's own testimony showed that they had neither a
present consent nor a holding out of marriage. 4 Therefore, plaintiff's
divorce petition should have been dismissed by the trial court.9 In the
other case, Hineman v. Hineman, Executor," the court held that there
was enough evidence, under the hornbook rule of the Amerine97 and
Whetstone9" cases, presented to the trial court that it would not disturb
the finding that no common law marriage existed.99
VII. CONCLUSION
It was said at the conclusion of the survey article last year that
"Family law tends to be a system of unique cases."1 ° The fifteen or
so cases decided this past year re-affirm that statement. Precedent works
poorly. Apparently the court views each set of facts on the merits and
then decides the case. Usually, they arrive at the correct result, but the
language of the opinion must be restricted to the narrow facts pre-
sented.
Two areas, the unfitness doctrine in custody and the separation
agreement in divorce, will bear watching. In this article, the problem
has been outlined only. The decisions are not clear and future litiga-
tions will result. After these new cases are decided, an article should
be written on each problem.
The cases decided by the Kansas Federal District Court and the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were surveyed. No family law cases
were found.
"Amerine v. Amerine, Executor, 178 Kan. 79, 283 P.2d 469 (1955); See Hopson, Family
Law, 4 KM. L. REv. 224, 238 (1955).
' 178 Kan. 595, 290 P.2d 1022 (1955).
"He flatly stated at the trial that he had never held the defendant out as his wife and that
they did not consider themselves legally married.
' Interestingly enough, the plaintiff "won" anyway. The trial court granted the divorce but
denied the wife's cross petition for separate maintenance. She appealed. The plaintiff now has
a judicial determination that he is single. This is certainly as good as a divorce.
9' 179 Kan. 543, 297 P.2d 149 (1956).
9' See note 92, supra.
9' 178 Kan. 595, 290 P.2d 1022 (1955).
' There was evidence that she had held herself out as the wife of deceased, but there was
evidence that she also held herself out as the wife of another man and had used her own name
for most business purposes.
'
9 Hopson, Family Law, 4 KAN. L. REv. 224, 240 (1955).
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